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THE ROLE OF EXPERTISE IN VFR FLIGHT DECISIONS WITH INCONSISENT WEATHER
INFORMATION
Jordan Petry, Landon Thomas, Heewoong Park, Wai-Tat Fu
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Urbana, Illinois
To study the role of expertise in weather-related VFR flight decisions we conducted two
experiments in which experts and novices were presented with inconsistent weather
information. In the first experiment 51 pilots performed a series of pre-flight planning
decision tasks. We found that experts were better at selecting reliable information than
novices. In the second experiment, 24 pilots made a VFR flight using the XPlane flight
simulator. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of four conditions with a different
combination of good and bad flying (rendered in XPlane) and ATIS weather. We found
that in poor weather conditions novices flew farther into bad weather than the experts
before diverting. In the condition with bad ATIS and good flying weather, experts all
made it to the destination while 67% of the novices diverted. Results have important
implications to how dynamic decision-making skills can be included in pilot training.
Weather-related accidents are a significant problem in general aviation (GA). According to the AOPA
Nall Report (2009), while weather-related accidents made up a small proportion of total GA accidents in
2008 (50 accidents, 4% of total), the fatality rate for these accidents was disproportionately high, at 70%.
Previous studies (e.g., Wiegmann, Goh, and O’Hare, 2002) found that less experienced pilots were more
likely to fly further into adverse weather than more experienced pilots, which indicates there are possibly
opportunities for training to help reduce the prevalence of weather-related accidents. Because differences
across weather products between experts and novices is not something that Wiegmann, Goh, and O’Hare
address in their study, we wanted to investigate this particular aspect of weather decision-making. To that
end, we designed two experiments to understand how expert and novice pilots access and integrate
multiple sources of weather information to reach a go/no-go decision. In particular, we expect that
decision errors will be more likely when there are inherent inconsistencies among weather reports. For
example, when a local area weather report shows that the weather is good but a weather forecast report
indicates that the flight will likely encounter instrument meteorological conditions (IMC), decisions by
expert and novice pilots will differ. To determine this, we designed multiple sets of inconsistent weather
reports to understand how expert and novice pilots resolved the inherent conflict when making a go/no-go
decision. In particular, we are interested in how pilots utilize different sources of weather information,
and how they prioritize each product (e.g. present weather v. forecast, human-produced v. machineproduced, etc), and if there are differences between how experts and novices use this information. Results
will provide significant implication to pilot training.
Experiment 1
Our first experiment investigates differences in how expert and novice pilots retrieve and view
pre-flight weather information. We developed a program to emulate computer-based weather sources
such as Direct User Access Terminal (DUAT) and Aviation Digital Data Service (ADDS) which would
display the weather to the subject and record information for later analysis. Given a set of seven text and
graphical, present and forecast weather products, subjects were asked to make a go or no-go decision for a
VFR (visual flight rules) cross-country flight in Central Illinois.

Materials
Weather Data Usage (WDU) is a program written to simulate a Direct User Access Terminal
(DUAT) weather briefing and allow recording of data parameters such as mouse clicks, time on-screen,
etc. WDU uses a menu-like interface to allow subjects to view their choice of seven weather products one
at a time (See figure 1). We created seven kinds of weather reports (TAF, METAR, FA, FD,
SIGMET/AIRMET, RADAR, and PIREPs). We divided these reports into multiple categories. First, we
identified the set of reports that are judged to be most important based on a pilot study. We found that
TAF and METAR seem to be most important, and we categorized these reports as “Major”, and the other
five reports as “Minor”. We also divided the reports into whether they provide forecast information (FA,
FD, TAF) and current weather information (the rest); and whether the current products were produced by
humans (PIREP) or by machine (METAR, RADAR). We then created two sets (either good/bad or
bad/good) of inconsistent weather reports for each of these 3 divisions of weather reports (i.e.,
Major/Minor, Present/Forecast, and Machine/Human), and two sets of weather reports where all 7 reports
were consistent (all good and all bad). There were therefore a total of 16 sets of weather report. Each
participant was given these 16 sets of weather reports in a random order.
Figure 1.
Weather Data Usage (WDU) Interface.

Note. Weather products are accessed via the menu on top.
Participants
Fifty-one subjects were recruited from the part 141 flight school at the University of Illinois
Institute of Aviation. For the purposes of this experiment the researchers define expert and novice pilots
as those who have more or less than 200 total flight hours, respectively. This consisted of twenty-eight
experts and twenty-three novice pilots. All subjects hold at least a Private Pilot certificate. We obtained
informed consent for each participant. Participants completed a questionnaire regarding demographics,
pilot certification, total flight hours, and personal weather practices such as weather minimums and
priority placed on certain weather products.

Task
Participants were asked to conduct sixteen simulated pre-flight weather briefing scenarios using
the information provided to them through our “Weather Data Usage” (WDU) platform. Participants
would have access to seven text and graphical weather products for each scenario and would make a “go”
or “no-go” decision for a VFR (Visual flight rules) flight between Greater Kankakee, Illinois (KIKK) and
Willard-Champaign, Illinois (KCMI) based on the information provided through WDU and using their
knowledge of weather and of their personal and legal limits.
Procedure
Subjects were briefly shown the use of the menu system and other task requirements. Subjects
were able to move freely between all weather products and stay on each for as long as they liked, until the
point at which they made their go/no-go decision. Subjects were given task instructions and a headset
microphone for recording verbal protocol, and were asked to “think aloud” to allow us to measure how
they interpreted the information presented on the screen.
In each scenario certain products would present information contradictory to other products,
which allowed us to see on which products subjects relied more heavily. At the bottom of the interface
was an “end scenario” button which the subject was instructed to click once they had made their “go/no
go” decision. At this point they selected their choice on the program as well as stated any reasons for their
choice to the voice recording. Once they clicked on their “go/no go” choice they were invited by another
button to continue to the next scenario (allowing them to take breaks between scenarios). Subjects would
repeat this process through each scenario until completing all sixteen scenarios. The subjects were asked
to make any final comments to the voice recording, then remunerated and dismissed.
Results
The mean estimated total flight hours for experts was 328.43 and the mean estimated total flight
hours for novices was 110.33. When there was high consistency among products, twelve percent more
experts than novices made a “go” decision in good weather. On average the experts made eight percent
(three percent in bad weather) more “go” decisions than did novices. Table 1 below shows the total go
and no-go decisions for each type of scenario, based on consistency among weather products.
Table 1.
Go/No-Go decision totals in Experiment 1.
AG
Expert
Novices

AB

MG

MB

HG

HB

PG

PB

Go

26

16

38

17

43

5

28

20

No Go

28

38

16

37

11

49

26

34

Go

15

13

19

10

31

4

19

13

No Go

27

29

23

32

11

38

23

29

Note. In column headings, first letter A=all, M=inconsistent major/minor, H=inconsistent
human/machine, and P=inconsistent present/forecast; second letter G=first set is Good, B=first set is Bad.
Thus, AG=all good; MB=major set is bad, minor set is good, PG=present is good, forecast is bad, etc.

As shown in Table 1, the most pronounced difference between experts and novices was in
scenarios with low consistency between “major” and “minor” weather products when the major weather
reports indicated good weather, but the minor reports indicated bad weather (i.e., in the MG column). In
fact, twenty-five percent more experts made a “go” decision in these scenarios compared to novices
(p<0.05). Interestingly, the difference was not as large when the major set was bad and the minor set was
good, in which case most expert and novice pilots decided not to go. Results indicated that expert pilots
would more likely choose to ignore the minor reports, where novice pilots tended to equally weigh these
reports (thus more likely making a “no-go” decision).
In addition, the difference between experts and novices was also large when the forecast weather
reports were bad but present was good. Results indicated that experts would more likely decide to go,
while novice pilots would more likely decide not to go in this set of inconsistent reports. However, this
difference did not reach statistical significance (p=0.2). Results again indicated that experts tended to
ignore forecast weather when they indicated bad weather, while novice pilots tended to equally weigh the
reports.
Results of this experiment draw some interesting questions. Why are experts more likely to make
a “go” decision when some weather products report the probability of entering IMC? Is this based on
experience, and they truly will not enter IMC when their pre-flight planning says they might? Do they
simply feel more comfortable with encountering IMC because they are instrument rated (all 28 experts
are instrument rated, while only 7 novices are)? If these decisions to go when some reports show possible
adverse weather, training should instill long-lasting focus on all weather products. If the experts
experience shows that some weather products, when taken in context, are more reliable than others, than
this can be applied to training as well. In any case further study should take place to investigate these
outcomes application to flight training.
Experiment 2
Materials
Our simulator was made up of the following equipment: XPlane 8.60 simulator software, a
control column manufactured by Precision flight controls (equipped with a control yoke, rudder pedal
assembly, and a throttle input knob), and mouse capability for point-and-click access to various functions
within the cockpit such as setting and identifying radio frequencies and navigational aids, as well as
speakers for hearing ATIS information produced in the simulation. The simulator was set up to emulate a
Piper Archer, which pilots in the flight program are familiar with. XPlane was modified for our
experiment to allow the researchers to change weather conditions between “good” (calm winds, clear
skies) and “bad” (strong winds, wind shear, overcast sky), and change output of “good” and “bad” ATIS
weather reports for both KIKK and KCMI.
Participants
Twenty-four subjects were recruited from the part 141 flight school at the University Of Illinois
Institute Of Aviation. This consisted of twelve experts and twelve novice pilots (defined previously). All
subjects hold at least a Private Pilot certificate. After completing the informed consent and questionnaire
mentioned above (Experiment 1, Participants), subjects were seated in our flight simulator.
Task
Participants were asked to make a simulated VFR (Visual flight rules) flight from Greater
Kankakee, Illinois Airport (KIKK) to Willard-Champaign, Illinois Airport (KCMI). They were provided
with the applicable VFR Sectional chart as well as use of navigational radios in the simulator. In flight
they would also have access to supplied ATIS information for KIKK and KCMI.

Procedure
Subjects were given instructions to make a VFR flight from KIKK to KCMI. They were briefly
shown the use of the simulator including how to change radio frequencies for ATIS briefings. Participants
were told that the general radial from KIKK to KCMI was 190° if they wished to use VOR navigation.
The subjects were asked to use verbal protocol methods for the duration of the flight. Participants were
instructed that if, at any point during the flight, they felt that they would make a weather diversion, they
should state those intentions explicitly on the verbal protocol and land the plane. Subjects were assigned
to one of eight condition groups (three per group), described in Table 2.
Table 2
Experiment 2 subject groups.
Condition

Group 1
EGAGW

G2
EGABW

G3
EBAGW

G4
EBABW

G5
NGAGW

G6
NGABW

G7
NBAGW

G8
NBABW

Note. E = expert, N = novice, G = good, B = bad, A = ATIS, W = weather trigger
Results
The mean estimated total flight hours for experts were 330.15 and the mean estimated total flight
hours for novices was 125.91.The distance between Greater Kankakee, Illinois Airport (KIKK) and
Willard-Champaign, Illinois (KCMI) is about 64 miles. Across all conditions, experts flew an average of
44.89 miles while novices flew an average of 39.95 miles. Table 3 shows the expert and novice average
flight distance between conditions. The condition with the greatest performance difference between
experts and novices was the condition in which subjects were presented with good weather, but an ATIS
report with bad weather. All three experts in this condition completed the flight to KCMI (average
distance 64.22 miles), while only one of three novices completed the flight (average distance 42.71
miles). Another condition which produced interesting results was that which had bad weather but a good
ATIS report. Experts on average diverted 4.1 miles earlier than novices.
Table 3.
Average flight distance.
condition
expert average distance (SM)
novice average distance (SM)

G1G2
64.22
64.22

G1B2
30.39
34.49

B1G2
64.22
42.71

B1B2
20.71
26.47

Note. 1= reported weather (ATIS), 2= actual weather.
These results may indicate that expert pilots rely more on what they are experiencing in real time
on their flight, while novices tend to rely more heavily on information provided to them via external
sources. This supports the findings of Wiegmann, Goh, and O’Hare (2002), who found a negative
correlation between flight experience and distance flown into adverse weather. It seems that when
comparing experts and novices, experts trust internal sources (i.e., their own flight experience) more
heavily than external sources (i.e., weather reports in ATIS transmissions), while the opposite is true for
novices. In these conditions, the novices’ decision to trust external sources is either dangerous or
expensive. In the bad weather condition with a good ATIS report, novices are flying into adverse weather

that they are not equipped to handle, and could end up as one of the statistics in the Nall Report. In the
condition where the weather is good but the ATIS is reporting bad weather, novices make a decision to
divert which is very possibly an expensive one (e.g., more fuel and Hobbs time, hotel, different form of
travel, etc.) when the true weather condition is actually safe to fly in. It is possible that these findings also
provide opportunity for better training in weather aeronautical decision-making; further investigation
should take place.
Conclusion and Discussion
We presented results from two experiments that studied how expert and novice pilots resolved
conflict among inconsistent weather information during pre-flight planning and in-flight decisions.
Experiment 1 shows that expert pilots, compared to novices, are in general more likely to make a “go”
decision in bad weather when presented with inconsistent reports. This could indicate a dangerous overconfidence effect in more experienced general aviation pilots, and should be investigated further.
One important result we found was that expert and novice pilots differed the most when the major
and minor sets of weather reports were inconsistent, and when the present and forecast reports were
inconsistent. In particular, when the minor set or the forecast sets of weather reports indicated bad
weather, expert pilots tended to put less weight on them, making them more likely to make a “go”
decision when the major or present weather reports indicated good weather. On the other hand, novice
pilots tended to be more “conservative”, as they seemed to put equal weights on all reports and would less
likely to make a “go” decision when some reports indicated bad weather.
Interestingly, in Experiment 2, when making in-flight decisions, novice pilots were more likely to
fly further into bad weather before making a decision to divert. This suggested that while novice pilots
were relatively more conservative when making a “go” decision compared to experts, they were less
likely to detect bad weather and decide to divert. It was possible that, for example, novice pilots had
fewer attentional resources while flying, and were less experienced in handling changes in weather,
supporting Wiegmann, Goh, and O’Hare’s results (2002). It is possible that even though expert pilots
made more “go” decisions even when there were reports indicating bad weather, they were more prepared
to change in-flight, and thus were more ready to detect changing a weather situation. Our current results
provide direction for future research to investigate these issues further to determine training techniques to
prevent low-time pilots from continuing flight into dangerous weather situations.
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